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Baraboo cuts off 81-year-old great-grandma’s water for resisting smart meter

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 Stop Smart Meters Wisconsin

July 10, 2013

NEWS FLASH: As I was writing this, Rep. Jeremy Thiesfeldt announced a smart meter opt out bill for Wisconsin, LRB 0644/2— Relating to:  installation of smart meters at premises of public utility customers and allowing an opt-out. He will talk today on Vicki McKenna’s radio show at 5:06 p.m. about the proposed bill. Please TELL state lawmakers to support this law, which protects individual property and health choices.

Yesterday Audrey Parker’s city shut off her water because she refused to get their new smart water meter due to health and privacy concerns. The City of Baraboo heard her request last fall to opt out of the radiofrequency emitting meter, and has threatened her with various shut off dates since then.

A growing number of people nationwide (and worldwide) are rejecting smart meters. Besides the point nininithat no one should be forced to have a radiation-producing meter against their will in order to get utility service, WI Public Service Commission code actually prohibits shut-offs for sensitive populations. So, likely this “smart” city has made a rather dumb decision legally, not to mention a heartless one.

PSC 113.0304(4) (4) Conditions for disconnection. A utility may disconnect only those households whose gross quarterly incomes are above 250% of the federal income poverty guidelines and where health and safety would not be endangered because of the infirmities of age, developmental or mental disabilities or like infirmities incurred at any age or the frailties associated with being very young, if service were terminated or not restored.

Baraboo should follow the example of Madison Water Utility and the Town of Sheboygan in allowing smart meter opt outs for individuals. The 2005 federal Energy law stated that smart meters should be “offered” not forced upon residents. Just because utilities “can” choose their own equipment does not mean they should trash customer service in the process. The Public Service Commission should make a ruling to allow it in the name of fairness and good customer relations. Last fall, the PSC denied a Madison petition for statewide utility customer “bill of rights” for opt outs.

Non-transmitting analog meters should be a choice for every resident in the state. To deny customers this choice is an abuse of power by these utility monopolies. It is about time Wisconsin had a law to protect utility customers from this bull-headed, heartless abuse.

Granite County Montana residents battle their own county government over implementation of Agenda 21

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Abuse of Power Granite County part 1 and 2

A little background to understand as to what’s happening. The man putting the commission on the spot was in essence punished by these commissioners for questioning the process they used to implement district zoning, affecting his property. Basically not in accordance the wishes of the people per the Growth Policy that they voted for in 2006. As a result they SLAPP‘d him and seized his property. See The View From Montana.org for more info.

What is SLAPP?

A strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) is a lawsuit that is intended to censor, intimidate, and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defense until they abandon their criticism or opposition.[1]

The typical SLAPP plaintiff does not normally expect to win the lawsuit. The plaintiff’s goals are accomplished if the defendant succumbs to fear, intimidation, mounting legal costs or simple exhaustion and abandons the criticism. A SLAPP may also intimidate others from participating in the debate. A SLAPP is often preceded by a legal threat. The difficulty, of course, is that plaintiffs do not present themselves to the Court admitting that their intent is to censor, intimidate or silence their critics. Hence, the difficulty in drafting SLAPP legislation, and in applying it, is to craft an approach which affords an early termination to invalid abusive suits, without denying a legitimate day in court to valid good faith claims.   More

Bush uses Presidential Directive to establish total surveillance state

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 mssing

June 5, 2008

National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive

  White House News

      NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD — 59
      HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/HSPD — 24

SUBJECT: Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security

Purpose

This directive establishes a framework to ensure that Federal executive departments and agencies (agencies) use mutually compatible methods and procedures in the collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information of individuals in a lawful and appropriate manner, while respecting their information privacy and other legal rights under United States law.

Scope

(1)  The executive branch has developed an integrated screening capability to protect the Nation against “known and suspected terrorists” (KSTs).  The executive branch shall build upon this success, in accordance with this directive, by enhancing its capability to collect, store, use, analyze, and share biometrics to identify and screen KSTs and other persons who may pose a threat to national security.

(2)  Existing law determines under what circumstances an individual’s biometric and biographic information can be collected.  This directive requires agencies to use, in a more coordinated and efficient manner, all biometric information associated with persons who may pose a threat to national security, consistent with applicable law, including those laws relating to privacy and confidentiality of personal data.

(3)  This directive provides a Federal framework for applying existing and emerging biometric technologies to the collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of data in identification and screening processes employed by agencies to enhance national security, consistent with applicable law, including information privacy and other legal rights under United States law.

(4)  The executive branch recognizes the need for a layered approach to identification and screening of individuals, as no single mechanism is sufficient.  For example, while existing name-based screening procedures are beneficial, application of biometric technologies, where appropriate, improve the executive branch’s ability to identify and screen for persons who may pose a national security threat. To be most effective, national security identification and screening systems will require timely access to the most accurate and most complete biometric, biographic, and related data that are, or can be, made available throughout the executive branch.

(5)  This directive does not impose requirements on State, local, or tribal authorities or on the private sector.  It does not provide new authority to agencies for collection, retention, or dissemination of information or for identification and screening activities.

Definitions

(6)  In this directive:

(a)  “Biometrics” refers to the measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) and behavioral characteristics that can be used for automated recognition; examples include fingerprint, face, and iris recognition; and

(b)  “Interoperability” refers to the ability of two or more systems or components to exchange information and to use the information that has been exchanged.

Background

(7)  The ability to positively identify those individuals who may do harm to Americans and the Nation is crucial to protecting the Nation.  Since September 11, 2001, agencies have made considerable progress in securing the Nation through the integration, maintenance, and sharing of information used to identify persons who may pose a threat to national security.

(8)  Many agencies already collect biographic and biometric information in their identification and screening processes. With improvements in biometric technologies, and in light of its demonstrated value as a tool to protect national security, it is important to ensure agencies use compatible
methods and procedures in the collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of biometric information.

(9)  Building upon existing investments in fingerprint recognition and other biometric modalities, agencies are currently strengthening their biometric collection, storage, and matching capabilities as technologies advance and offer new opportunities to meet evolving threats to further enhance national security.

(10) This directive is designed to (a) help ensure a common recognition of the value of using biometrics in identification and screening programs and (b) help achieve objectives described in the following:  Executive Order 12881 (Establishment of the National Science and Technology Council); Homeland Security Presidential Directive‑6 (HSPD‑6) (Integration and Use of Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism); Executive Order 13354 (National Counterterrorism Center); Homeland Security Presidential Directive‑11 (HSPD‑11) (Comprehensive Terrorist Related Screening Procedures); Executive Order 13388 (Further Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans); National Security Presidential Directive‑46/Homeland Security Presidential Directive‑15 (NSPD-46/HSPD-15) (U.S. Policy and Strategy in the War on Terror); 2005 Information Sharing Guidelines; 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism; 2006 National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel; 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security; 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing; and 2008 United States Intelligence Community Information Sharing Strategy.

Policy

(11) Through integrated processes and interoperable systems, agencies shall, to the fullest extent permitted by law, make available to other agencies all biometric and associated biographic and contextual information associated with persons for whom there is an articulable and reasonable basis for suspicion that they pose a threat to national security.

(12) All agencies shall execute this directive in a lawful and appropriate manner, respecting the information privacy and other legal rights of individuals under United States law, maintaining data integrity and security, and protecting intelligence sources, methods, activities, and sensitive law enforcement information.

Policy Coordination

(13) The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, in coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, shall be responsible for interagency policy coordination on all aspects of this directive.

Roles and Responsibilities

(14) Agencies shall undertake the roles and responsibilities herein to the fullest extent permitted by law, consistent with the policy of this directive, including appropriate safeguards for information privacy and other legal rights, and in consultation with State, local, and tribal authorities, where appropriate.

(15) The Attorney General shall:

(a)  Provide legal policy guidance, in coordination with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), regarding the lawful collection, use, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information to enhance national security; and

(b)  In coordination with the DNI, ensure that policies and procedures for the consolidated terrorist watchlist maximize the use of all biometric identifiers.

(16) Each of the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the DNI, and the heads of other appropriate agencies, shall:

(a)  Develop and implement mutually compatible guidelines for each respective agency for the collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information, to the fullest extent practicable, lawful, and necessary to protect national security;

(b)  Maintain and enhance interoperability among agency biometric and associated biographic systems, by utilizing common information technology and data standards, protocols, and interfaces;

(c)  Ensure compliance with laws, policies, and procedures respecting information privacy, other legal rights, and information security;

(d)  Establish objectives, priorities, and guidance to ensure timely and effective tasking, collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information among authorized agencies;

(e)  Program for and budget sufficient resources to support the development, operation, maintenance, and upgrade of biometric capabilities consistent with this directive and with such instructions as the Director of the Office of Management and Budget may provide; and

(f)  Ensure that biometric and associated biographic and contextual information on KSTs is provided to the National Counterterrorism Center and, as appropriate, to the Terrorist Screening Center.

(17) The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the DNI, shall coordinate the sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information with foreign partners in accordance with applicable law, including international obligations undertaken by the United States.

(18) The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, through the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), shall coordinate executive branch biometric science and technology policy, including biometric standards and necessary research, development, and conformance testing programs.  Recommended executive branch biometric standards
are contained in the Registry of United States Government

Recommended Biometric Standards and shall be updated via the NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management.

Implementation

(19) Within 90 days of the date of this directive, the Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, the DNI, and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, shall, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, submit for the President’s approval an action plan to implement this directive.  The action plan shall do the following:

(a)  Recommend actions and associated timelines for enhancing the existing terrorist-oriented identification and screening processes by expanding the use of biometrics;

(b)  Consistent with applicable law, (i) recommend categories of individuals in addition to KSTs who may pose a threat to national security, and (ii) set forth cost-effective actions and associated timelines for expanding the collection and use of biometrics to identify and screen for such individuals; and

(c)  Identify business processes, technological capabilities, legal authorities,  and research and development efforts needed to implement this directive.

(20) Within 1 year of the date of this directive, the Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, the DNI, and the heads of other appropriate agencies, shall submit to the President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, a report on the implementation of this directive and the associated action plan, proposing any necessary additional steps for carrying out the policy of this directive.  Agencies shall provide support for, and promptly respond to, requests made by the Attorney General in furtherance of this report.  The Attorney General will thereafter report to the President on the implementation of this directive as the Attorney General deems necessary or when directed by the President.

General Provisions

(21) This directive:

(a)  shall be implemented consistent with applicable law, including international obligations undertaken by the United States, and the authorities of agencies, or heads of such agencies, vested by law;

(b)  shall not be construed to alter, amend, or revoke any other NSPD or HSPD in effect on the effective date of this directive;

(c)  is not intended to, and does not, create any rights or benefits, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law or in equity by a party against the United States, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

 

GEORGE W. BUSH

 

 

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